Superfast and maneuverable, stealthy, and providing its pilot with instantly comprehendible information about everything going on around him, the F-22 ❤️ incorporates so many fighter “firsts” that it will be the benchmark of air combat power for at least a quarter-century.

Almost ❤️ every year since the program’s inception, however, the F-22 has been hounded by budget-cutters in Congress and the Pentagon who ❤️ question the Air Force’s need for such a powerful fighter. Especially now, with defense budgets at near-historic postwar lows, critics ❤️ hold the Raptor up as a prime example of an expensive program that doesn’t know the Cold War is over, ❤️ a case of technological overkill for the fighter threats that may pop up in the coming decade.

The F-22 program has ❤️ been cut, delayed, or restructured so many times in the last seven years that most observers have lost count. Originally ❤️ pegged at a buy of 750 airplanes, the planned inventory slipped to 650, then 600, then 442, and now, with ❤️ the Quadrennial Defense Review, 339–slightly more than three wing’s worth. As the buy has descended, unit cost has climbed, and ❤️ some members of Congress worry that the F-22 may price itself out of existence. As Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) recently ❤️ remarked in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, “We must be vigilant that the program not go the way of ❤️ previous programs” such as the B-2, “where the sticker shock overwhelms the capability improvements.”

To underline the point, Congress has imposed ❤️ aR$40.9 billion program cost cap on the F-22, much as was done with the B-1B and B-2 programs. If the ❤️ project exceeds the cap, the Air Force must fund the overage from other accounts.

With the reduced buy, the Pentagon also ❤️ cut the peak production rate of the F-22 from 48 per year to 36 a year, reduced the engine buy ❤️ from 1,027 to 777, and cut the initial production batch from 70 to 58 aircraft.